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Abstract: One of the key areas where the United States is generally 
contrasted to France is law. Yet pitting the common law tradition against 
Napoleon's civil code obscures the diversity of the French justice system, as 
well as the differences between English and US experiences. This paper 
tells how, when preoccupied with reforming judicial procedure, both 
before and after the Civil War, New Yorkers were inspired by some lesser 
known corners of French justice, such as the conciliatory “justices of the 
peace” and the lay, elected, but official “commercial courts”. It draws on 
research by Amalia Kessler on the birth of the US “adversarial tradition” 
and complements it with a focus on merchants and their disputes. It shows 
that the relationships of New York merchants with the legal system were, 
in the first half of the century, remarkably similar to those of their French 
counterparts, and in many respects shaped by shared trans-Atlantic 
experiences. Ironically, though, explicit attempts at importing elements 
from the French judicial system happened, in the late 1840s to mid-1870s, 
were instrumental in strengthening the idea of a distinctly US national 
character with, among other, procedural implications. They ultimately led 
to the invention of what was deemed a specifically American way to deal 
with (commercial) disputes. 
 
One of the key areas where the United States is generally contrasted to France is law, and this 
contrast is possibly thought to have been strongest in the early 19th century. In the 1800s, 
Napoleonic codification had organized substantive law and the judicial system along 
supposedly clear, hierarchical lines. One of its aims had been to end the legal pluralism of the 
Old Regime, whose overlapping jurisdictions gave rise to very long lawsuits. Courts were now 
organized like a French garden. Moreover, their judges were supposed to act as a mere “mouth of 
the law,”1 not to interpret it. On the contrary, each American state had its own judicial 
                                                 
1On the French post-revolutionary political culture, and on this famous quote from Montesquieu, see ROSANVALLON Pierre, 
The demands of liberty: Civil society in France since the Revolution, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2007. 
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organization and, while debates were heated between advocates of jurisprudence and 
legislation, it was clear that judicial precedent was to play an important role in the evolution 
of the common law. Moreover, the period I study is known as that when judges very often 
exhibited substantive discretion when choosing to interpret precedents in a way that would 
promote economic growth (or the interests of merchants and manufacturers), as opposed to late 
19th-century legal formalism.2 
This general contrast shaped many political debates: its discursive importance is undeniable. It 
however fails to capture daily experiences with the judicial system in both countries – 
especially those of merchants,3 a very important part of the political and social elite in the 19th 
century, and prominent users of the legal system, because of their credit disputes, quarrels 
stemming from the risks of shipping goods through the Atlantic, etc. 
Along with a clear hierarchy of professional judges, the Napoleonic Codes had established 
or confirmed hundreds of lay courts with cheap, simple procedures that dealt with 
hundreds of thousands of cases per year, including almost all credit disputes, commercial or 
otherwise. Appeals from such courts were only authorized above a certain amount in dispute, so 
that the lay judges enjoyed a wide degree of discretion. Among those courts were 220 
commercial courts (tribunaux de commerce).4 In all cities and commercial towns, they were the 
official first-degree courts for commercial disputes. They were widely used, and generally 
deemed satisfactory by the diverse French governments (they cost little, judged quickly, and 
could easily be praised as either very traditional or very modern) as well as by merchants 
themselves. One telling proof of their success is the failure of almost all attempts at establishing 
parallel, private arbitration schemes. Most merchants seemed happy with the peculiar mix of 
the official and the informal offered by commercial courts. Their official character promised 
efficient action against debtors, while the fact that judges were elected merchants and enjoyed a 
lot of procedural and substantive discretion offered opportunities to adapt the law to dominant 
economic practices (or the practices of the economically dominant). 
No such thing existed in the US. However, as we will see, contrary to their English counterparts, 
New York merchants seem to have enjoyed the same proficiency in the use of law and 
courts as the French. Moreover, they regularly discussed possible improvements in mechanisms 
for the resolution of commercial disputes, and experimented with such alternative mechanisms. 
Those debates and experiments, in the first half of the century, exhibit similarities with 
continental European practices that point to a relatively common Atlantic experience. 
From the 1840s onward, on the contrary, more frequent direct references to European, 
including French, institutions went hand in hand with the differentiation of what was 
considered as a distinctly American way to adjudicate disputes. My claims in this respect are 
mostly based on a thorough investigation of debates on and practices of commercial arbitration in 
the New York Chamber of Commerce.5 This case study led me to conclusions extremely close to 
those of Amalia Kessler, which I will also briefly present. She has studied the birth of the US 
                                                 
2HORWITZ Morton, The transformation of American law, 1780-1860, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1977. 
3Unless otherwise specified, I use the word “merchant,” as was done at the time, both to refer specifically to wholesale, large-
scale merchants who also had financial activites, and more generally to denote all traders, manufacturers, insurers, bankers, 
etc. 
4LEMERCIER Claire, Un modèle français de jugement des pairs. Les tribunaux de commerce, 1790-1880, manuscript for 
habilitation, University of Paris 8, 2012, available online. 
5Rare Book and Manuscripts Library, Columbia University Library: New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry records, 
1768-1984 – cited as NYCC in the remainder of this paper. 
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“adversarial tradition” in the same period, focusing more on the New York experience of the 
Chancery Court and on debates on the transplant of “courts of conciliation” from France.6 I very 
much follow her in arguing for the interest of a history of procedure (debates on, and practices of 
procedure) as a symptom of many social and cultural evolutions, and particularly of changing 
definitions of national characters. In this paper, I emphasize two aspects that are present but 
more understated in her book: first, the fact that evolutions in the early decades of the 19th 
century, especially in New York, are to be understood in a transatlantic, rather than strictly 
American or Anglo-American context; second, the idea of “legal irritants,” borrowed from legal 
sociologist Gunther Teubner, which has relevance beyond the context of legal studies. Teubner 
highlights the irrelevance of the mechanical or organic metaphor of the transplant to study 
international circulations: nothing has ever been imported after having been surgically isolated 
from its original system, and it's not even enough to envision reception as adaptation. We should 
rather think of deliberate attempts at transplantation as “irritants” that often trigger 
unintended responses – as when, in the 19th century, a growing interest in foreign systems went 
hand in hand with sharper definitions of national characters. 
An Atlantic model (1760s-1840s): A “body politic” negotiating local trade customs 
The arbitration practices of the New York Chamber of Commerce, from its birth in the late 
colonial period to the 1840s, exhibited many similarities with the continental European, and 
especially the French experience. While there was no commercial court in New York, the familiarity 
of merchants with law and courts was akin to that of their counterparts in e.g. Bordeaux or Nantes – 
shaped by European ways to deal with maritime and commercial disputes that had come to span 
the Atlantic. There were shared practices, but almost no explicit references to France in those 
decades. 
 
The Chamber of Commerce: a chartered corporation inheriting continental European practices 
 
The New York Chamber of Commerce was created in 1768.7 As such, it is one of the oldest 
“Chambers of Commerce” in the English-speaking world. Such organizations, that had older 
Mediterranean origins, had been systematically established in the commercial cities of France, 
from the mid-17th to the mid-18th century. This, as well as the creation of new commercial courts, was 
part of an economic policy that had begun with Colbert, the minister of Louis XIV, and continued 
beyond the Revolution, esp. with Chaptal, a minister under Napoleon. Colbert's name is generally 
associated with statism, yet he was also interested in getting better information, and even collecting 
advice, from merchants8. French Chambers of Commerce were not mere merchant guilds: they 
enjoyed an official status and ran important harbor facilities. On the contrary, the “Chambers of 
Commerce” that were created in Great Britain, Ireland and Scotland have always remained 
                                                 
6KESSLER Amalia D., “Deciding against Conciliation: The Nineteenth-Century Rejection of a European Transplant and the 
Rise of a Distinctively American Ideal of Adversarial Adjudication”, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 2009, vol. 10, pp. 
423-483; KESSLER Amalia D., Inventing American Exceptionalism: The Origins of American Adversarial Legal Culture, 
1800-1877, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2016. 
7FRIEDMAN Lee M., “The First Chamber of Commerce in the United States”, Bulletin of the Business Historical Society, 1947, 
vol. 21, n° 5, p. 137-143. 
8MINARD Philippe, La fortune du colbertisme : État et industrie dans la France des Lumières, Paris, Fayard, 1998. 
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purely private associations (even if many tried to become official at some point).9 
In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the New York Chamber stood somewhere in between 
those two models. Like many other corporations of the early Republic, it had been chartered by King 
George III in 1770, then by the State of New York in 1784.10 This implied an official recognition that 
went beyond that of a mere club – and, as a counterpart, specific duties. Until the late 19th century, it 
was nothing like a place to socialize (it didn't even have a fixed location). Its main activities were 
lobbying for commerce (e.g. canals, bankruptcies, and the codification of commercial laws were topics 
for petitions to the State and the US legislators), improving the harbor (e.g. by the establishment of a 
nautical school),11 and, as we will see, trying to standardize trade practices. As a regulator of the 
harbor, the Chamber was similar to its counterparts in Bordeaux or Nantes: its executives were 
elected by members who had themselves been co-opted; yet their influence was also backed by State 
recognition. As such, the New York Chamber of Commerce should be considered as part of a 
system that, on both sides of the Atlantic, ensured that merchants as a group had a voice in the 
negotiation and implementation of official commercial norms. The exact ways in which they played 
this role certainly varied between New York and Bordeaux – but not much more than between 
Bordeaux and Le Havre, New York and New Orleans, or between the mid-18th and mid-19th centuries. 
On both coasts, the State and civil society were much more intertwined than is generally thought; 
moreover, the legal distinction between the private and the public, and especially private vs. public 
corporations, appeared much later in New York than in other parts of the Northeast.12 
The early arbitration practices of the New York Chamber were also similar to continental 
European procedures. In its early years, the Chamber was used by local colonial courts as a 
referee: the courts referred the parties to arbitration by the Chamber.13 Yet this “reference” had 
little to do with the English practice bearing the same name. On the contrary, it appears very 
similar to what was found in Paris at the same time when the (official) commercial court referred 
parties to guild official who tried to settle the disputes and, when it was not possible, wrote a 
report on the case.14 This role, called arbitre rapporteur, was neither that of an English judge nor 
that of an English jury (or even that of an English equity examiner). It might have been inherited 
from the New York courts of the Dutch West India Company, that had very much used this 
procedure in commercial cases.15 In the late colonial period, when it only had a few dozen 
members, the young Chamber of Commerce tried to gain in legitimacy by playing this role of 
arbitre rapporteur for official courts. 
It was, however, a double-edged sword, as this role was expanded, in 1779-1784, on behalf of the 
English occupants. At a time when courts, except the Court Martial, did not work, the Chamber 
                                                 
9The other first Chamber in the English-speaking world, also created in 1768, was established in Jersey. BENNETT Robert J., 
Local Business Voice: The History of Chambers of Commerce in Britain, Ireland and Revolutionary America 1760-2011, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
10For the NYCC charter, see Stevens John Austin, Colonial records of the New York Chamber of commerce, 1768-1784, New 
York, J.F. Trow & co., 1867, p. 89-97. 
11HEFFER Jean, Le port de New York et le commerce extérieur américain, 1860-1900, Paris, Université de Paris I Panthéon-
Sorbonne, 1986. 
12See e.g. WILLIAMS Joan, “The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in American Law”, Texas Law Review, vol. 64, 
n° 225, pp. 225-250; HARTOG Hendrik, Public property and private power: The corporation of the city of New York in 
American law, 1730-1870, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1983. 
13Earliest arbitration records of the Chamber of commerce of the state of New York, New York, Press of the Chamber, 1913; 
NYCC, box 326, folder 5. 
14KESSLER Amalia, A Revolution in Commerce. The Parisian Merchant Court and the Rise of Commercial Society in 
eighteenth-century France, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2007. 
15AIKEN John R., “New Netherlands Arbitration in the 17th century”, Arbitration Journal, 1974, vol. 29, n° 3, p. 145-160. 
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replaced them to officially adjudicate 200 commercial cases. This involvement with the former 
colonists did not damage the institution, however: after a mere change in membership, its charter 
was renewed in the Spring of 1784. It was mostly inactive in the 1790s-1810s, but the first 
decades had left their mark. The Chamber was not a mere private club, one of its goals was to 
arbitrate disputes, and the accepted way to do so was quick and informal, as opposed to 
following the English rules of evidence (the “statute of frauds,” which was theoretically valid in 
New York common law courts). It is important to know about this background so as not to 
systematically look for the origins of arbitration in an American exceptionalism. The 
puritans, the Quakers, then the Mormons promoted community arbitration and quoted Saint 
Matthew on the perils of going to court.16 Yet this religious impetus probably needed imported 
templates (the inherited Dutch procedure of arbitre rapporteur, the fashionable French 
organization of Chambers of Commerce – both in fact widespread all over continental Europe) in 
order to be able to influence judicial practices. The fact that Federalist lawyers prided themselves 
with reading civil law treatises and experimenting with procedures inspired by the Roman-canon 
law might have made these templates even more attractive.17 
 
Merchants who spoke the language of the law 
 
New York merchants in the first half of the 19th century also resembled their French 
counterparts, rather than their colleagues in Manchester or Liverpool, in that they lived 
and acted “with the law”, rather than “before the law,” i.e. they did not hesitate to use 
lawyers and courts and were fluent enough in their language.18 
Although this point should certainly be backed by an analysis of the archives of firms, it is already 
clear from the records of the NYCC, especially when contrasted with the mottos of English 
campaigns for the creation of commercial courts in the 1850s.19 Those primarily advocated access 
to justice. Merchants in the most important English ports and industrial cities claimed that they 
had nowhere to go to recover large debts or litigate important commercial disputes: the high 
courts in London were extremely slow and expensive and dealt with few cases. Other merchants, 
however, opposed the creation of special courts, especially with merchant judges, because they 
accepted the received wisdom that law was something too important to be left to them – it was “a 
closed book” for merchants and was to remain so. Debates on commercial arbitration and 
litigation in New York never became as heated as in England, and they never mentioned access to 
justice before the 20th century. There were little debates because, as we will see, the 
arbitration provided by the Chamber of Commerce was seen as a complement to litigation, 
not a substitute. Access to justice, moreover, was apparently not a problem for the shipping 
merchants who dominated the Chamber until the 1870s. 
US and especially New York merchants indeed seem to have enjoyed the same familiar 
                                                 
16Horwitz, Transformation, 140-159; AUERBACH Jerold, Justice Without Law? Resolving Disputes Without Lawyers, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1984; STEINBERG Allen, “"The Spirit of Litigation": Private Prosecution and Criminal Justice in 
Nineteenth Century Philadelphia”, Journal of Social History, 1986, vol. 20, n° 2, p. 231-249. 
17It was especially the case of James Kent; see e.g. Chapter 1 in Kessler, Inventing. 
18I follow the distinction made by EWICK Patricia et SILBEY Susan, The Common Place of Law. Stories from Everyday Life, 
Chicago-Londres, University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
19On these campaigns, see LEMERCIER Claire, “How do businesspeople like their courts? Evidence from mid-19th centry 
France, England, and New York City”, University of Michigan Legal History Workshop/Law & Economics Workshop, 
2015, available online. 
6 
relationship with the law and courts as their French or Parisian counterparts, even if there was 
no commercial court in New York. The number of judges, especially in the State Supreme Court, 
was generally raised when the caseload increased, contrary to what happened in England, and 
merchants seem to have had no difficulty to use the Court of Chancery, in Albany (which had 
borrowed some continental European procedures).20 In 1808, the first US jurisprudence 
publication, The American Law Journal, was presented as a tool for merchants, among others. 
“The most consistent legal theorist of market economy” according to Morton Horwitz, Gulian 
Crommelin Verplanck, was born in a merchant family; his uncle by the same name had arbitrated 
for the Chamber of Commerce in 1785-99. John Duer, a judge and author of treaties favoring 
insurance, had a nephew, William Denning Duer, a banker and director of insurance and railway 
companies, who similarly was part of the arbitration committee in 1858-60.21 The biographies of 
the dozen most active arbitrators at the NYCC more generally show that they were prominent 
members of the Chamber more generally; they were at the peak of their merchant career, in their 
forties or fifties; they shipped goods to and from the Caribbean, China or Europe; some were also 
insurers, bankers or real estate brokers. They came from various US States (few were born in 
England or Scotland) and religious denominations. They appear very diverse, but they clearly 
built a merchant elite that was not afraid of lawyers22 and knew about commercial and legal 
practices out of the US.23 
Why, then, would they want to arbitrate – which was somewhat daring, as the contemporary 
jurisprudence leaned against this option24 – if they had no reason to be afraid or weary of 
courts? The archives are not very explicit on the reasons why the Chamber, when it was revived 
in the late 1810s, promoted its own, more autonomous arbitration system. In the late 19th and 
early 20th century, promoters of arbitration criticized juries (supposed to be unpredictable and 
not versed enough in the trade), as had, in the late 18th century, the “founding father” James 
Wilson25. However, I found no explicit criticism against juries in the archives of the Chamber 
(otherwise prolix as regards law) before 1870. In one of the other Chambers of Commerce that 
provided arbitration in the late 18th century, this happened at a same time when juries had been 
reformed to include more merchants, suggesting, once again, complementarity rather than 
competition between arbitration and courts.26 My hypothesis is that, in the first half of the 19th 
century, New York merchants arbitrated in order to negotiate customs, rather than to 
adjudicate disputes. 
 
                                                 
20See Kessler, Inventing, Chapter 2 and e.g. BROWNE Irving, “The Judiciary”, in Paul A. CHADBOURNE & Walter BURRITT 
MOORE (dirs.), The Public Service of the State of New York, Boston, James R. Osgood and Co, 1882, vol.3. 
21Horwitz, Transformation, 180, 234. 
22The Chamber regularly asked counsels before petitioning on legal matters, and especially when it drafted bill proposals – it 
happened for the first time in 1819, about bills of exchange (NYCC, box 395, 27 March 1819). 
23In 1860, one of the rare honorary memberships was awarded to the former president of the Bordeaux commercial court. 
NYCC, box 398, minutes, 1 March 1860. 
24The “Vynior's Case” allowed the parties to have a court void any arbitration award, and it was especially influent in New 
York. BENSON Bruce L., “An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration 
in the United States”, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 1995, vol. 11, n° 2, p. 485-487. 
25See e.g. COHEN Julius Henry, “The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute”, The Yale Law Journal, 1921, 
vol. 31, n° 2, p. 150, and “Lectures on law, delivered in the College of Philadelphia, in the years 1790 and 1791”, part II, 
chapter III, in WILSON Bird (ed.), The works of the honourable James Wilson, LLD, Philadelphia, Lorenzo Press, 1804. 
26HADDEN Sally E., “The Business of Justice: Merchants in the Charleston Chamber of Commerce and Arbitration in the 
1780s and 1790s”, in Jonathan WELLS & Jennifer R. GREEN (eds.), The Southern Middle Class in the Nineteenth Century, 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2011. 
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Informal arbitration as a way to negotiate trade customs 
 
From the late 1810s to the late 1840s, the Chamber of Commerce grew from 40 to 200 
members – along with New York commerce and population – and began its intensive 
petitioning and monitoring of the harbor. The latter included, as it already had in the late 
18th century, the drafting and publication in newspapers of “mercantile regulations,” i.e. 
prescriptions as to the proper use of bills of exchange, units of measurement, and the proper 
rates for brokerage and storage commissions.27 The Chamber could not make them compulsory, 
but used its official status to promote them as references. Producing such references was all the 
more important at a time when “customs” were more and more used by courts as default rules 
when the intent of the parties was not clear.28 “Mercantile regulations” were one way in which 
the Chamber could hope to influence both merchant practices and judicial decisions. 
Arbitration awards arguably was another, although they do not seem to have been widely 
disseminated before the 1870s. It is likely that they circulated among Chamber members, and 
merchants more generally (the Chamber met in cafés and exchanges). 
Under the guise of arbitration, the Chamber was regularly asked questions that had been 
abstracted from specific cases, and it answered in a way that aimed at setting a custom. For 
example, it was asked “when a bill of lading specifies a freight to be paid here, in “pounds 
sterling », at what rate should it be calculated? ».29 The party who received an answer to such a 
question could then use it in court, or as a threat of going to court and winning. The New York 
Chamber even appended its seal (one of the attributes of its official character) on a couple of 
certificates intended for foreign courts.30 This attestation – in fact, the creation – of a custom by 
an officially recognized group was known in 18th and 19th-century France as a parère, and 
performed in the same way, especially by Chambers of Commerce.31 This is not to say that the 
New Yorkers had a direct French inspiration here (although it is likely that they knew certificates 
of customs to be one of the things French Chambers produced), but merely to assess that here, 
too, the same practices occurred on both sides of the Atlantic – and faded after the mid-
century. 
What about the arbitrations that more specifically decided on one case? Contrary to most courts, 
the members of the arbitration committee only operated when the parties had agreed on the 
facts. They were to send a jointly written “statement of facts,”32 and the whole investigation was 
then based on the exchange of a few letters and on an oral discussion between arbitrators: there 
were no oral testimonies, cross-examinations, etc., and in most cases, the arbitrators never met 
the parties. Some of the documents sent to the Chamber had been authenticated by notaries or 
port authorities, but most had not. This simple procedure is likely to have evolved from 
continental European legacies, which was not uncommon in the US at that time (it looked 
like a simple version of the procedure at the Albany Court of Chancery). It accommodated the 
                                                 
27NYCC, minutes, box 394, 3 April 1770, 2 August and 1 November1785; box 395, 2 March 1819; box 397, 2 October 1856. 
For examples of circulation of such rules, see “Commercial Epitome”, The Economist, 3 août 1850, p. 18-20; BUTTS Isaac 
Ridler, The business man’s law library, Boston, I.R. Butts, 1857, p. 105. 
28Horwitz, Transformation, 190-201. 
29 NYCC, minutes, box 395, 19 November, 14 Decembre 1819 – a lot of similar questions are in box 1. 
30NYCC, minutes, box 395, 7 January 1823 (“in courts of law abroad”); box 1, folder 3, file “1822” (Swiss court). 
31Hirsch, Jean-Pierre. Les deux rêves du commerce. Entreprise et institution dans la région lilloise, 1780-1860. Paris: éditions 
de l’EHESS, 1991. 
32NYCC, box 279, folder 1, rules of the arbitration committee, 24 May 1822. 
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busy schedule of merchant parties (sometimes in foreign countries, as arbitration was open to 
non-members until 1860) and arbitrators, and allowed cheap decisions, but not on a large 
caseload: the Chamber only dealt with one to four cases per year.33 This has nothing to do with 
the caseload of a French commercial court (thousands of cases per year in the largest cities). It is 
likely that most parties, when already in dispute, could not be brought to agree enough on the 
facts to accept such a procedure. 
Arbitration was not therefore meant to enforce e.g. the recovery of debts, but to settle disputes 
on principles between parties who agreed to accept the authority of the Chamber about 
the proper customs of the trade. For example, “The committee not recognizing the existence of 
any custom applicable to this case [we]re of opinion that an allowance of 1 1/4% is an equitable 
compensation”.34 In an early report, the committee clearly admitted that it was prepared to base 
an award solely on fairness reasons.35 It even sometimes openly decided against custom, based 
on “free market” principles.36 
Arbitration at the NYCC until the 1850s illustrates practices of trade regulation that were 
similar on both sides of the Atlantic, which is not necessarily surprising, as they regulated 
transatlantic trade. I have emphasized its continental European, and especially French origins, 
not to say that commercial disputes in New York were solved in the same way as in Paris, but to 
question two more common assessments of US arbitration, and US law more generally. First, the 
roots of arbitration in the NYCC were not specifically American; second, the legal 
experience of New York merchants had little in common with that of their English 
partners: its peculiarities were not due to “the common law tradition” generally. However, it is 
striking that NYCC members almost never explicitly mentioned European courts or 
procedures at that time. Ironically, their growing interest for “commercial courts” after 
1850 ended up with changes that eventually transformed arbitration practices into 
something specifically American, much more different from the French model than before. 
Explicit discussions on Continental European models were key to the birth of a distinctly 
American procedural tradition. 
 
Legal irritant (1840s-1910s): From attempts at creating a “commercial court” to the birth of 
“US amicable arbitration” 
While the Chamber of Commerce, being chartered, had been endorsed by the State of New York, 
its awards, during the first half of the 19th century, had no legal authority. The Chamber drew on 
its official status and on the authority of its arbitrators in the merchant community and 
hoped that it would be sufficient in order to have the awards play the role of guidelines for 
commercial practice. For some of the members, however, it was not enough: they advocated 
                                                 
33I found information on a total of 121 cases for 1818-1874 in NYCC, boxes 1, 2, 3, 22, 24, 25, 58, 60, 325, 371, 375, 462, 
463; this survey is likely to be exhaustive. 62% were shipping disputes (on charter parties, bills of lading, demurrage, etc.). 
34NYCC, box 1, folder 2, 12 November 1834. 
35NYCC, minutes, box 395, 4 May 1819. “The Committee determined that the charge of $15 for re-exchange not being 
sanctioned by usage, cannot be maintained, but they unanimously decide that it is fair and equitable, and would have 
allowed it as a precedent, had not a law (lately passed respecting damages on returned inland bills) rendered it unnecessary.” 
The Chamber had petitioned the State Legislature for this law on February 3rd. 
36NYCC, box 462, 17 December 1863 : “A general usage of this kind presents so many obstacles to a free market, and the 
power of the owner to use all reasonable means to dispose of his property, that it has no claim for adoption as a rule of 
trade and commerce.” 
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the creation of a genuine commercial court. This demand of an official status was part of a 
wider interest, in New York, for Continental-European lay courts: courts that would have an 
official status, but simple procedures and judges with little legal training, and that would 
hopefully foster conciliation. However, such attempts at legal transplant failed. This failure 
reveals that the parties themselves, as well as political actors, had already begun to take 
for granted, and more specifically for American, a specific type of procedure (that is today 
called “adversarial” and requires much formality) and a sharp divide between public and 
private institutions. 
 
Foreign inspirations used in attempts at officialization 
 
The idea of a commercial court appeared three times in the minutes of the New York Chamber 
of Commerce between 1839 and 1851; the topic was tabled, but after more and more serious 
investigations.37 In each case, the aim clearly seemed to have been officialization: a 
commercial court would be a court, i.e. more than mere arbitration. Two decades later, when the 
NYCC was briefly authorized to run such a court, it was mocked by a newspaper as “a semi-
judicial authority with a high-sounding and impressive name.”38 This certainly captures much of 
what New Yorkers – as well as English campaigners – sought in the French model: acquiring more 
prestige without losing the control of the Chamber on the institution; adding the charms of an 
official status to those of self-regulation.39 However, it was not easy to plan exactly which type of 
court to establish. 
In 1839, John J. Boyd mentioned a “Tribunal or Court of Commerce » that would have a  
merchant jury without a judge, deciding both on facts and law.40 This project was tabled without 
much comments, and arbitration went on as usual. It might have been triggered by growing 
discussions in New York, and the US generally, about European courts of conciliations: after the 
financial panics of 1837 and 1839, looking into French models could be seen as a way to better 
police the market society.41 It was also a moment when the Chamber tried to expand its activities 
generally; and the members might have been aware of the contemporary creation of a short-lived 
commercial court in New Orleans, a harbor that was then as important as New York (the judge of 
this court actually came from New York).42 
The 1847 proposal for a “court of conciliation for the adjudication of commercial causes” 
                                                 
37NYCC, minutes, box 396, 5 March and 2 April 1839; box 296, April-September 1847, February 1851-December 1852; box 
227, folder 6. 
38The Daily Graphic, 14 March 14 1876. 
39This is close to what Hirsch, Les deux rêves, defined as “the two dreams of commerce”: adventure and institution, self-
regulation and protection. 
40NYCC, minutes, box 396, 5 March and 2 April 1839. 
41Kessler, “Deciding.” 
42This little-known bilingual institution, active until 1846 (it produced 8,000 decisions), was however very different from the 
New York experiments in arbitration and from Boyd's proposal. The judge was a lawyer, unlike his French counterparts, 
and the jurisdiction was wider than in France, but the simple procedure and heavy caseload very much resembled the 
French model. Kilbourne, Richard. Louisiana Commercial Law: The Antebellum Period. Baton Rouge: Publications of 
the Institute Paul M. Hebert - Law Center - Louisiana State University, 1980, 84-107; “Commercial Court (Orleans 
Parish)”, <http://nutrias.org/inv/commct.htm>; BULLARD Henry Adams et CURRY Thomas, A new digest of the statute 
laws of the State of Louisiana, La Nouvelle-Orléans, E. Johns, 1842, 234-237, 831; KER Robert J., Proceedings and 
debates of the Convention of Louisiana, La Nouvelle-Orléans, Besancon, Ferguson & Co., printers to the Convention, 
1845, 676-690. 
10 
looked more promising, as its author was the president of the Chamber, James Gore King.43 
King, who had been banker in Liverpool, was the brother of a Governor of New York and became a 
member of the US Congress in 1849-51; he had studied law in Harvard, and one of his sons joined 
the New York Supreme Court in 1850: he exemplified the close relationships with the legal 
and political worlds of frequent NYCC arbitrators. He was also a Whig, like most of those who 
campaigned for lay courts inspired from France in England as well as in the US. He was probably 
driven to the idea of a specialized commercial court by English debates: it was English reformers 
who had begun to advertise for French (and Danish) “courts of conciliation » (juges de paix and 
conseils de prud'hommes), and one of them, lord Henry Brougham, was very much read in the US; 
in 1849, both Brougham and Liverpool merchants were to begin a campaign for “tribunals of 
commerce » in the same spirit.44 The phrasing of King's proposal is that of debates inspired by 
Brougham at the New York Constitutional Convention in 1846: this Convention, after heated 
debates, had not directly endorsed courts of conciliation, but had allowed the state legislators to 
create such courts. The reformers considered the idea of “domestic tribunals” as modern in 
that they promoted a simple procedure, stripped of technicalities. References to France 
offered a way to jointly promote two Benthamian ideas that had been favored by the 
Chamber of Commerce: the codification of law and this simplification of procedures. 
The King proposal of 1847 was studied, but not very much pushed forward by the Chamber.45 In 
1851, Boyed rephrased his previous version, including an explicit reference to continental 
Europe: as New York had become as important in commerce as European cities, it deserved 
the same kind of courts. He now planned to have judges, elected by the Chamber of Commerce, 
along with a jury, randomly drawn from its members. What he had in mind was a “court of 
record,” at the level of the highest courts of the State; decisions were to be officially enforced and 
the court, if it did not cover its costs, should be funded by the city or county. After a lively 
discussion and a vote of 12 v. 10, the Chamber however decided that the proposal should not be 
sent to the State legislators. Opponents do not seem to have disagreed on the general aim of the 
proposal, but they feared that the State would oppose it anyway because it differed to much from 
custom as to the role of the jury, or because it could be considered unconstitutional, in terms of 
separation of powers, to have the Chamber control such a court.46 
In the 1860s, the Chamber of Commerce pursued a less radical officialization strategy. The 
phrase “tribunal of commerce” briefly resurfaced in discussions on the renewal of its charter, but 
was quickly abandoned. However, the State Congress, in the new charter of 1861, opened the 
possibility for the awards of the Chamber to be certified by a court of record, in order to become 
official precedents. The Chamber did not have its own court, but its awards had gained some 
legal authority and prestige, which was all the more important because of a nascent 
competition from business associations.47 Yet it was not enough for some members, and the 
                                                 
43NYCC, minutes box 396, 6 April, 4 May and September 1847. On King, “Obituaries”, New York Times, 5 October 1853. 
The NYCC maintained a correspondence with the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce during the English campaign, but dit 
not react when sent material on commercial courts. Minutes, box 298, 2 March 1865. 
44Kessler, “Deciding;” Lemercier, “How do businesspeople.” 
45It was however mentioned in the press, e.g. The New York Observer and Chronicle, 10 April 1847, p. 59. 
46NYCC, minutes, box 396, 4 February, 1 April, 2 December 1851, 6 January, 3 February, 7 December 1852; box 227, folder 
6, Report of April 1851. 
47On this competition, e.g. NYCC, box 400, June 3 and November 4, 1875. On some new associations, e.g. the New York 
Commercial Exchange in 1861, providing arbitration (and having obtained a similar provision by the State), JONES William 
Catron, “Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey”, Washington University Law Quarterly, 
1956, p. 462-463. 
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idea of a genuine “tribunal of commerce for the speedy, judicial and economical settlement of 
disputes among merchants and others” resurfaced at the end of 1873.48 This time, thanks to an 
active lobbying of the State Congress by members of the Chamber, the proposal became a law: a 
“Court of Arbitration” was launched in April 1874. It is likely that this new attempt was 
triggered by the renewal of English debates on commercial courts, which were covered by the 
press in the whole English-speaking world.49 The author of the proposal was again a banker, 
Elliott F. Shepard (1833-1893) – an active Republican, and a lawyer, who created the New York 
Bar Association in 187650. He mobilized other lawyers by criticizing delays and the incompetence 
of the jury in ordinary courts – questions that the Chamber had never much commented on 
before.51 David Dudley Field, the famous author of the New York Code of procedure, who had 
supported courts of conciliation in 1846 and campaigned in the 1860s, with the support of the 
NYCC, for codification, backed his proposal.52 
 
Campaigns for legal transplants: from looking into Europe to defining America 
 
However, the Court of Arbitration was short lived, in spite of, or possibly because of this 
endorsement by lawyers. Similarly, what happened in the US at a wider scale was a 
codification of procedural law that put emphasis on the formal adversarial procedure, 
rather than on the example of the lay, conciliatory French courts. The constitutional 
debates of the late 1840s, while they had increased interest for European models, had also 
given birth to an articulate discourse opposing the transplant of “courts of conciliation” by 
presenting them as the product of feudal (traditional and unequal) European political 
systems – paternalist institutions perhaps suited for agrarian societies, but not for the 
modern United States. Conversely, features of the adversarial procedure, such as the 
public, oral cross-examination of witnesses, were heralded as necessary in an advanced 
democratic society, one that relied on individual freedom and free market, even if they 
reduced access to justice by increasing costs and delays.53 An official report in 1862 stated that 
“in consequence of the forms of government, habits, and institutions in Europe differing so 
essentially from those of our own […] all the features and peculiarities of those tribunals could 
not be adopted here”.54 What had been heralded by law reformers as modern (courts of 
conciliation dismissing mere legal technicalities) was now dismissed as too traditional for the US. 
Enquiries into European models that were aimed at allowing a legal transplant rather crystallized 
the definition of a distinctly American model, forbidding such a transplant, and endangering the 
kind of previously unnoticed hybridization of legal traditions that was at play in New York 
commercial arbitration. 
The joint study of practices of arbitration and discourses on the proper way to solve disputes and 
                                                 
48NYCC, minutes, box 399, 2 October, 6 November, 4 December 1873, 8 and 10 January 1874. 
49See for example discussions in Canada as reported in New York: “Dominion Board of Trade. Important session yesterday. 
The fisheries, the establishment of Tribunals of Commerce, and other matters discussed.”, New York Times, 28 février 
1874. 
50“Elliott F. Shepard dead”, New York Times, 25 mars 1893. 
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52NYCC, box 465; minutes, box 397, 6 February 1847. 
53Kessler, “Deciding.” 
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on foreign models allows us to better understand the chronology of the process, and therefore its 
logics. The New York Chamber archives are an interesting complement to Kessler's study in that 
they exhibit a growing demand for procedural formalism expressed by the parties 
themselves: some before the constitutional discussions of 1846 (when a trend toward 
adversarialism was also found by Kessler at the Court of Chancery), many afterwards, and 
especially in the 1860s. Of course, it is likely that some merchants had such preferences before 
they were publicly articulated as part of a distinctly American character. However, public 
debates certainly were key in the making of a genuine tradition: something that began to 
be taken for granted. 
In 1844, the Chamber still opposed the examination of witnesses, because of costs and delays; in 
1849, it had to surrender and authorize it.55 Parties required more precise justifications in the 
awards, the communication of all the pieces, hearings that would allow them to actually meet the 
arbitrators, and wanted to have their say on the written evidence of their opponents.56 The new 
charter that, in 1861, allowed some awards to be certified by courts of records added a separate 
impetus for formalization, as this required oaths from the arbitrators and from the parties.57 The 
Chamber also had to pledge itself to follow the laws of the State, and it bought a few legal 
treatises.58 In 1864, arbitrators refused to answer direct questions on custom, that were deemed 
too abstract.59 The arbitrators more and more used the vocabulary of courts in their 
correspondence to talk about the arbitration committee, and so did the parties.60 This evolution 
in the demands of the parties does not seem to have been caused by a more common use of 
lawyers (who already represented some parties in the 18th century): it rather appears as a 
symptom of the quick institutionalization of the new procedural tradition. All these changes 
did not support arbitration at the Chamber: the number of cases it dealt with – with increased 
delays – dwindled in the 1860s-1870s (whereas commerce boomed after the Civil War). In the 
last case the committee dealt with, just before the opening of the “Court of Arbitration,” a 
Bostonian party deemed the Chamber's rules “entirely unjust” because of the lack of the now 
customary adversarial procedure.61 What the parties now wanted from the Chamber (and from 
its new competitors in the provision of arbitration) was not an authorized opinion on custom, 
but the resolution of a dispute, with all due guarantees. Incremental changes thus had 
slowly wiped out the arbitration tradition of the Chamber, without any explicit notice of 
this fact by its members. 
When re-opening the debate on “tribunals of commerce” in 1873, the lawyer Shepard 
apparently wanted to thwart this tendency toward becoming a court with an adversarial 
                                                 
55NYCC, box 227, folders 4 and 5, box 396, 3 September, 18 December 1844, 2 January, 6 February 1849. Oral testimonies 
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procedure. He explicitly stated that the judge should be free to call expert witnesses rather that 
passively take stock of the evidence offered by the parties – like in the European “inquisitorial” 
tradition, rather than the US “adversarial” one. He made positive references to the paternal justice 
of “patriarchal times,” reversing the rhetoric that had won against courts of conciliation 25 years 
before.62 He quoted statistics from Paris, hoping that it would be possible to deal with as many 
cases (i.e. almost 70,000 in 1869) as in a French commercial court. Such a position, however, 
could not be heard any more in 1873, be it by merchants in the Chamber of Commerce who 
faced the new demands of the parties or by the State legislators. 
The new “Court of Arbitration” was, first and foremost, a court: it inherited very little from 
previous experiments of arbitration at the NYCC. The only judge, appointed by the Governor, 
confirmed by the Senate and paid by the State, was a Doctor of Laws, Enoch L. Fancher, who just 
came out of the State Supreme Court.63 In spite of his inaugural speech opposing the “true 
principles of justice” to “forensic contests,”64 and of ostensibly flexible rules of evidence, he 
heavily used the public, oral, stenographed examination and cross-examination of witnesses, 
sometimes lasting more than ten days for one case.65 When confronted with doubts on a custom, 
he cited legal treatises rather than authoritative merchants.66 His trajectory was that of a typical 
US legal reformer, from insisting on substance over form to putting emphasis on the 
modernization of judicial organization and embracing the adversarial procedure. When the 
parties added adjunct “arbitrators” from the commercial world to Fancher, as the rules allowed 
them to, those were in fact treated as mere expert witnesses. Whereas the new institution had 
been praised by most newspapers as an entirely new thing inspired by foreign models (e.g. 
“the first regular court of arbitration ever established in the US”)67, its delays – months rather than 
days –, caused by Fancher's very American procedural choices, were soon criticized. In December 
1874, a newspaper had already concluded that the Court of Arbitration was “nothing more than 
an new Supreme Court”.68Fancher only dealt with ten cases per year. The court was never 
formally abolished, but ceased to exist in the early 1880s.69 
 
Going private: from official to amicable arbitration 
 
The Court of Arbitration articulated the public and the private in a way that was very 
different from that of the previous Committee of Arbitration – and deemed problematic by 
many contemporaries. Instead of a chartered association offering informal conciliation and 
advice to members, it was a typical official court hosted by a chartered association. What 
had been lost in this evolution – in fact already in the dwindling practice of arbitration in the 
1860s – were European-inspired procedures (written statements of facts, certificates of 
                                                 
62“to carry the administration of justice back to its pristine glory in the patriarchal times, when the head of the tribe sat in the 
gate of the city and dispensed justice, himself protecting the weak and defending the ignorant”. The Court of arbitration 
[…] An Address on the subject, delivered by Elliott F Shepard, [...], New York, Press of the Chamber, 1875. 
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customs, etc.). What was still present, but less and less consensual, was the idea that the 
State could give the Chamber authority on commerce generally – at a time when a new 
industrial elite fought for precedence in New York with merchants.70 
The debates of the 1870s were partly debates on the possibility, and suitability, of 
articulating the public and the private in the organization of justice. More importantly, 
they were read as such by campaigners for arbitration in the 1910s – at a time when the 
NYCC enthusiastically joined the progressive mobilization on this topic.71 They knew that the 
Court of Arbitration had failed, and they explained this failure by a lack of separation 
between the public and the private. In this way, they created a new American tradition of 
purely amicable, unofficial arbitration – a phrasing which they used in Europe in the 1920s to 
contrast it both with the English and the continental European tradition. What they promoted at 
that time was in fact as different from what the Chamber had done in the early 19th century as it 
was from the failed attempt at officialization in the 1870s. 
The Court of Arbitration had caused heated debates among State legislators in the 1870s, before 
and mostly after its creation (there were multiple amendments, a veto of the Governor, etc.). Most 
were related to disagreements about its funding between New York City and the non-commercial 
remainder of the State of New York. Opponents to the Court argued that taxes on the country 
should not be used to create an institution that would solely benefit the wealthiest merchants.72 
The jurisdiction of the Court was indeed limited to disputes situated in the City or Harbor of New 
York; but the city and county did not want to pay either, partly because they were governed by 
Democrats, whereas Fancher and most of the Chamber executives were Republicans. The fact that 
the funding was never completely secured (Fancher was only paid twice) partly accounts for the 
failure of the institution. However, in the retrospective view of the 1910s, something that had 
in fact very little been discussed in the 1870s was put forward, rather than those political or 
geographical divides: the fact that the Court of Arbitration, as a public-private hybrid infringing 
the separation of powers, was unconstitutional. According to arbitration propagandist Charles 
Bernheimer,73  answering in 1915 to a student at the Harvard Business School, “The European 
Systems could not be used because of fundamental differences in conceptions of law, and of 
customs, and because it was impossible to make a semi-governmental institution [...]. A 
Commercial Court according to our American conception of equality of all, would eventually 
develop into 'class legislation', which is contrary to the spirit of our American institutions”.74 In 
addition to the idea that US democracy was incompatible with European-inspired courts, an idea 
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that, as we have seen, was born during the mid-19th century debates, Bernheimer describes the 
public-private divide as sharper in the US. Whereas the Chamber of Commerce, when 
campaigning for arbitration under his impetus, studied French commercial courts more 
thoroughly than at any time before, and constantly praised them,75 this praise could not be 
envisioned anymore as leading to an attempt at legal transplant. 
As we have seen, arbitration in the 19th-century New York Chamber of Commerce in fact 
had constantly hybridized public and private elements, in various arrangements. Yet its 
practices was not perceived as such by the promoters of “organized but extra-legal 
arbitration, tribunals”76 who now wanted arbitration to be legally permitted, but otherwise 
free from official interference. Rather than looking for officialization, as their predecessors had, 
they emphasized a male ethics of commerce that would, in and of itself, support the purely 
private organization of arbitration practices.77 When involved in discussions about the creation of 
the Court of Arbitration in the new International Chamber of Commerce in the early 1920s, 
Bernheimer and his successors had already transformed this discourse into the alleged 
description of an intrinsically American branch of arbitration, less legal than the English 
or continental European one – purely private and amicable, only relying on moral sanctions for 
enforcement.78 
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